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FOREWORD
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
LEGAL SYSTEM: OBSERVANCE, APPLICATION,
AND ENFORCEMENT
Beth Van Schaack*
Since the founding of our republic, the United States has
been an active participant in international law making, and
our Supreme Court has a long history of identifying and enforcing international law. Even so, starting with the Court's
2002 Term, the quality and quantity of Supreme Court cases
touching on international law has significantly raised the
visibility of this tradition on the bench, in the academy, in the
press, and among members of the general public.! The fact

* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A., Stanford University; J.D., Yale Law School. I am indebted to Bradley Joondeph for
his thoughtful comments on this introduction and to the articles and symposium
editors of the Santa ClaraLaw Review.
1. See generally Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's
Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855 (2005) (undertaking "docket analysis" to identify
early judicial involvement in foreign affairs); Harold Hongju Koh, Agora: The
United States Constitutionand InternationalLaw: InternationalLaw as Partof
Our Law, 98 A.J.I.L. 43 (2004) (discussing the long history of international adjudication).
2. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Olympic Airways v. Husai, 540 U.S. 644 (2004);
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004), Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426 (2004); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). See generally Jordan Paust, InternationalLaw
before the Supreme Court: A Mixed Record of Recognition, 45 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 829 (2005) (discussing cases from the Court's most recent Term). For a
discussion of the October 2002 Term, see Janet Koven Levit, Going Public with
Transnational Law: The 2002-2003 Supreme Court Term, 39 TULSA L.J. 155
(2003).
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that we are a nation at war' in part explains the proliferation
and greater salience of international law on the domestic
docket. The metaphorical "war on terror" and companion
conventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have occasioned a
series of important cases concerning the justiciability of international law norms and the limitations they place on executive power. Other recent international law cases are attributable to seemingly inexorable processes of globalization,
which increasingly create opportunities for individuals hailing from different nations to come into contact with each
other in commerce and in crime. Victims of international law
violations can reach U.S. courthouses through various forms
of migration, the work of transnational advocacy networks,4
and statutory avenues for redress.5 These endeavors coincide
with legislative and judicial efforts to extend the extraterritorial reach of U.S. prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction.
As Professor John Yoo of Boalt Hall School of Law emphasized in his symposium remarks, globalization guarantees increased opportunities for courts to consider the applicability
and enforcement of international law.6 Thus, the topic of this
Santa Clara Law Review Symposium, International Law in
the United States Legal System: Observance, Application,
and Enforcement, is a timely one.
It is also a vexing one. The nature of international law
and the structure of our domestic system hinders the easy intersection of these two bodies of law. As a threshold issue,
the sources of international law-treaties, custom, and general principles-differ significantly from their domestic coun-

3. See Louis Henkin, War and Terrorism: Law or Metaphor, 45 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 817 (2005) (advocating a narrow application of the term "war").
4. See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS
BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
5. The statutory framework includes the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §

1350 (2000) (allowing aliens to sue individuals responsible for international
torts), the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (allowing
aliens or U.S. nationals to sue individuals responsible for torture or summary
execution), the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000) (allowing
nationals or their representatives to sue individuals responsible for designated
acts of terrorism), and the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et

seq. (2000) (allowing suits by aliens or U.S. nationals against states for various
international law violations).

6. John Yoo, Remarks at International Law in the United States Legal
System: Observance, Application, and Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2005) (transcript
on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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terparts, leading to challenges of identification and application. Treaties, for example, import their own doctrinal entourage, including specific rules of interpretation 7 and principles
of self-execution.8 The identification of customary international law-emerging as it does from the practice of states attributable to opiniojuris -and general principles of law" invites a rigorous and unfamiliar comparative analysis of
foreign government statements, actions, and legislation. The
United States' constitutional and federated structure, with
governmental power distributed between nested sovereigns
and then further divided among branches of government
through the separation of powers, further complicates the application and enforcement of international law in the U.S. legal system.
Combined, these factors give rise to a number of unanswered questions surrounding the chosen topic of this symposium. To what extent does international law-in treaty or
customary form or as embodied within a judgment emanating
from an international tribunal-provide a rule of decision directly enforceable by U.S. courts? When does international
law provide litigants with private rights of action and when is
implementing legislation required for justiciability? To what
extent does international law constrain executive or legislative choices, or can the political branches override international law?" Where international law does not provide a rule
of decision, what role should it play as an interpretive aid for
constitutional or statutory analysis? Our constitutional text,
corpus of judicial precedent, and history of state practice pro-

7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
8. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of SelfExecuting Treaties, 89 A.J.I.L. 695 (1995) (discussing execution doctrines).
9. Opiniojuris is a sense of legal obligation. See generally Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (2001).
10. See generally Christopher A. Ford, JudicialDiscretion in International
Jurisprudence:Article 38(1)(C) and "General Principles Of Law," 5 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 35 (1994) (discussing theories for identifying general principles of law).
11. See generally Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is The PresidentBound By The
Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004).
12. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (both citing foreign and international cases as persuasive
authority).
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vide only partial answers to these questions. And, as Judge
Rosalyn Higgins of the International Court of Justice emphasized in her keynote address, the resolution of these issues
may turn as much on cultural factors as it does on legal or
doctrinal ones. 3 In addition, there remain a series of normative questions on whether the application of international law
advances U.S. interests. The issue is thus a multifaceted one,
as ably demonstrated by the contributors to the symposium
and this issue.
Long-time international law scholar Louis Henkin, professor emeritus at Columbia Law School, launches our issue
with a compelling essay on the uses and misuses of metaphor
in international law discourse." Echoing the symposium remarks of Dr. Bertrand Ramcharan, former Acting United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,15 Professor Henkin argues that the events of September 11th and subsequent
exercises of preemptive self-defense have rendered the United
Nations Charter neither obsolete nor defunct. Rather, Henkin argues, this framework can accommodate these new challenges to international peace and security to make certain
that we remain a world community governed by law and the
noble tradition of cooperative action envisioned and enabled
by the Charter system. He calls on us all, and especially the
younger generations such as those responsible for this symposium, to work collectively to ensure that the age of terrorism,
inaugurated by the events of September 11th, does not eclipse
the age of international human rights, launched at the close
of World War II.
Professor Jordan Paust of the University of Houston Law
Center next turns a critical gaze on six cases from the Supreme Court's most recent Term that touch on international
law and foreign affairs. 6 Starting with the "terrorism trilogy," Professor Paust demonstrates that the Court is not fully
embracing international law as a direct source of authority,
but is instead applying it tangentially and selectively. This
13. Rosalyn Higgins, Keynote Address at International Law in the United
States Legal System: Observance, Application, and Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2005)
(transcript on file with the Santa ClaraLaw Review).
14. Henkin, supra note 3.
15. Bertrand Ramcharan, Remarks at International Law in the United
States Legal System: Observance, Application, and Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2005)
(transcript on file with the Santa ClaraLaw Review).
16. Paust, supra note 2.
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approach threatens uncertainty and inconsistency where
courts domesticate particular international rules and principles ad hoc, independent from their fuller normative context.
Thus, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1 7 the Court determined that the
so-called "September 11th Resolution""8 provided an implied
congressional authorization for the detention of combatants
during armed conflict-a foundational principle of the laws of
war that allows for such detentions for the duration of hostilities to prevent combatants from returning to the theatre of
war. The Court did not, however, invoke or apply other substantive rules of international humanitarian law related to,
and indeed hinging on, this right of detention, such as the obligation provided by the Geneva Conventions to treat wartime
detainees as prisoners of war until a "competent tribunal" has
determined their status. 9 Likewise, with respect to Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain,2 Professor Paust laments that the Court, in
considering whether the Alien Tort Statute2 ' enables victims
of international human rights torts to sue for redress in U.S.
courts, may have missed a far richer history of the types of international infractions recognized at our nation's founding as
giving rise to private rights of action.
Next, Professor Julian Ku of Hofstra University School of
Law focuses specifically on the constitutional allocation of
power to interpret customary international law-that unwritten species of international law premised on state practice
and a belief in the existence of a legal obligation. He warns
of the emergence of a structural conflict between the judicial
and executive branches if the judiciary were to adopt an interpretation of customary international law that may be contradicted or repudiated by an alternative executive interpretation. Advancing the premise that the executive branch
should play the definitive role in the interpretation, application, and execution of customary international law as part of
its conduct of foreign affairs or the exercise of its more general Article II "executive power," Professor Ku proposes sev17. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
18. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 (2001).
19. Article 5, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 134.
20. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
22. Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the Interpretationof Customary InternationalLaw, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857 (2005).
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eral rules of deference to guide the judiciary's consideration of
customary international law to avoid these structural conflicts. These rules would be applicable in the various contexts
in which these conflicts might arise: where the courts employ
customary international law to interpret a treaty or statute,
or where they employ customary international law as a rule
of decision, as in Sosa.
Professor Jenny Martinez of Stanford Law School focuses
her contribution on the effect of international decisions in
U.S. courts and situates the contemporary debate within the
broader historical context of U.S. participation in international adjudication and arbitration. 3 Her contribution comes
as the Supreme Court was considering the case of Medellin v.
Dretke,24 which concerned the question of whether and how
U.S. courts are to give effect to a decision of the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") in a contentious case between the
United States and Mexico.2" In that case, the ICJ held that
the rights of petitioner and fifty-one other Mexican nationals
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations26 were
violated when they were tried and sentenced without being
provided notice of their right to consular assistance as set
forth in the binding treaty.2 7 Professor Martinez recounts the
iterative dialogue that has occurred through several cases
over time between the ICJ and state and federal courts adjudicating claims brought under the Vienna Convention, as the
ICJ became "increasingly blunt"2 8 in its criticism of the
United States' lack of adherence to the treaty and increasingly precise about the relief that is due. To complicate matters further, the executive branch recently interjected itself
into this dialogue in the form of a memorandum from President George W. Bush directing courts, as a function of international comity, to give effect to the ICJ's decision with re23. Jenny S. Martinez, Enforcing the Decisions of InternationalTribunals in
the U.S. Legal System, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 877 (2005).
24. The Court recently concluded that certiorariwas improvidently granted,
because the petitioner may receive the relief he seeks through Texas state proceedings. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (2005) (per curiam).
25. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128
(Mar. 31, 2004).
26. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature Apr.
24, 1963, ratified by the United States Dec. 24, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261.
27. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 106.
28. Martinez, supra note 23.
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spect to the individuals named therein.29 The memorandum
occasioned a terse response from Texas state officials, who
have argued that the memorandum exceeds the constitutional
bounds of federal authority.0 The dispute raises complex
questions concerning the breadth of the president's power to
determine how the nation will comply with its treaty obligations and the judgments of international courts, as well as his
authority to command state governments to take certain actions to effect such compliance. Against this convoluted account of resistance and compliance, Professor Martinez emphasizes the rich history of U.S. courts' applying
international law and acceding to international arbitration
under less politically perilous circumstances. While it is
tempting to focus on the high-profile wartime cases for guidance about the applicability and enforceability of international law in the domestic system, Professor Martinez notes
that the highly charged political context in which these cases
arise obscures a more routine and less controversial history of
the use of international law in more quotidian commercial
disputes. This history suggests that the enforcement by domestic courts of the decisions of international tribunals does
not necessarily or indelibly impinge on sacrosanct prerogatives of state sovereignty.
Finally, Francisco Rivera, an Assistant Attorney with the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, provides a perspective from the Southern Cone and an institution with an uneasy relationship with the United States.3 Rivera describes
29. Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/Annex2oftheBriefAmicusCuriaeofthe
UnitedStatesinsupportofRespondentPresidentialDirective-vl.PDF (last visited
May 9, 2005).
30. See, e.g., Hugh Dellios & Steve Mills, Bush Administration Orders
States to Review Cases of Mexicans on Death Row, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 8, 2005
(recounting statement by Texas Attorney
General), available at
http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/world/11084237.htm (last visited May 9, 2005).
31. Francisco Rivera, Inter-American Justice: Now Available in a U.S. Federal Court Near You, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 889 (2005). The Inter-American
Court adjudicates claims brought against state parties to the American Convention on Human Rights that have accepted its jurisdiction. See Inter-American
Court, Basic Documents Pertainingto Human Rights in the Inter-AmericanSystem, OEA/ser. L.N./II. 92, doc. 31 rev. 3, at 17 (1996). By contrast, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights has a broader reach and can hear
claims against state parties to the American Convention or the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. Id. at 25. The United States is a party
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the interaction of the Inter-American human rights system
with U.S. domestic courts adjudicating human rights claims
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act. While this hemispheric "community of courts"32 may
have concurrent jurisdiction over particular incidents or policies, the quality of redress may vary given differences in their
direct accessibility to victims, the nature of respondent entities (and their ability to consider state versus individual or
corporate responsibility), and the relief available. Indeed, as
Rivera describes, many paradigmatic incidents of rights violations in the Southern Cone have given rise to cases in multiple fora, providing opportunities for stereoscopic justice.
Rivera emphasizes that such regional fora ensure that international protection may be available where domestic processes are ineffective or unavailing and that U.S. courts are
situated within a web of international adjudicative bodies capable of providing a measure of judicial oversight.
As our contributions reveal, the status of international
law vis-A-vis the U.S. domestic system remains contested, and
may herald a schism on the Court and elsewhere between
those willing to look past our borders for interpretive and authoritative guidance and those insisting that it is only domestic law and values that matter. Like the early development of
the common law, this is an evolutionary process. As Professor Naomi Roht-Arriaza of Hastings College of Law emphasized in her symposium remarks, these cases create an opportunity for synergistic constitutional, comparative, and
international law analysis that will increasingly weave international law norms and discourse into our domestic legal fabric.33 As more international law issues come before the Court,
to the American Declaration, but not the American Convention; accordingly, the
Court does not have jurisdiction over disputes involving the United States, but
the Commission does. The Commission, for example, entertained a petition involving detainees on Guantanamo. See Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Mar.
12,
2002,
http://www.photius.com/roguenations/guantanamo.html#_ftn7
(last visited
July 30, 2005).
32. Lawrence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 372 (1997) (calling attention to "a community of courts around the world, units engaged in a common
endeavor").
33. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Remarks at International Law in the United
States Legal System: Observance, Application, and Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2005)
(transcript on file with the Santa ClaraLaw Review).
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it is perhaps inevitable that justices will exhibit a greater facility with international law reasoning and sources, and perhaps even a greater receptivity to consider international law
where relevant to constitutional and statutory jurisprudence.
As Professor Martinez postulates in her contribution, this receptivity will trickle down to the lower courts, whose judges
look to the Supreme Court for guidance. Although the Supreme Court cases to date have not resolved all issues regarding the applicability of international law to executive action
or the justiciability of international law norms, they did confirm that executive action, even in a time of war, is not beyond judicial review and that international law at times provides a private right of action for its violation.

